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Abstract
We show that a broad class of DSGE models with housing and collateralized borrow-
ing predict a fall in house prices following positive government spending shocks. By
contrast, we show that house prices in the US rise persistently after identified positive
government spending shocks, using a structural vector autoregression methodology and
accounting for anticipated effects. We clarify that the incorrect house price response is
due to a general property of DSGE models—approximately constant shadow value of
housing—and that modifying preferences and production structure does not help in ob-
taining the correct house price response. We then show that the effect on house prices
is positive only when monetary policy strongly accommodates government spending
shocks. The model, however, does not deliver a persistent rise in house prices. Prop-
erly accounting for the empirical evidence on government spending shocks and house
prices using a DSGE model therefore remains a significant challenge.
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1 Introduction
House price changes determine the amount of funds that financially constrained homeowners can
borrow against the value of their homes for current consumption. If fiscal policies affect house
prices, they can provide a channel for influencing private consumption, and hence aggregate de-
mand in the economy. This is important in the context of the US economy for two reasons. First,
the slow recovery following the 2008 financial crisis has coincided with a renewed interest in de-
termining the effects of fiscal policy and a better understanding of its transmission mechanism.1
Second, the persistent weakness in the housing market continues to be a major concern for economic
recovery. Although the federal spending allotment of $14.7 billion under the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 and housing policies under the Making Home Affordable
Program may have slowed the decline in house prices, it is estimated that even by the first quarter
of 2013, 19.8% of mortgaged homes were worth less than their outstanding mortgage amounts.2
For both reasons, empirical evidence on the effects of fiscal policies on house prices can help inform
policy on the housing market. At the same time, models used for policy analysis should reflect this
evidence. Surprisingly, however, neither has such evidence been adequately established, nor has
the effects of discretionary fiscal policy on house prices been properly studied. Our paper attempts
to fill this gap.
The objectives of this paper are twofold: First, to determine the effects of government spending
shocks on house prices empirically, and second, to examine whether dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) models with housing can account for these effects, as DSGE models are widely
used in informing policy.3
We estimate the effect of government spending shocks on house prices in the US economy using
a structural VAR approach pioneered by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). We augment the VAR with
forecast errors of the growth rate of government spending as in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012),
to account for the potential timing mismatch between private agents’ anticipation of government
1See, for example, Romer (2011).
2CoreLogic Report (June 2013) and Sengupta and Tam (2009).
3The nexus between the housing market and the macroeconomy has received renewed interest from both
academics and policy makers. See Iacoviello (2010) for a recent perspective and Leung (2004) for an early
review.
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spending and actual spending, as highlighted in Ramey (2011). Our main empirical finding is that
real house prices rise persistently after a positive government spending shock.4 The increase in
house prices is statistically significant and peaks between 5 and 8 quarters in the specification that
accounts for anticipation effects. This result is robust to disaggregating total government spending
to consumption and investment spending, to different subsamples in the data, and to a variety of
specification checks.
In sharp contrast to the empirical evidence, we highlight that real house prices fall in a DSGE
model with housing after a positive government spending shock. We demonstrate this counter-
factual result relative to the SVAR evidence by introducing government spending shocks in the
Iacoviello and Neri (2010) model of housing, with (patient) lenders and (impatient) borrowers, and
housing production. This framework is a natural starting point for studying the dynamic effects of
shocks on house prices and has been widely used in the literature for this purpose.5
Why do house prices fall after positive government spending shocks in the model? The intuition
follows from the approximately constant shadow value of housing for lenders – a property that was
shown by Barsky et al. (2007) to produce a counterfactually negative comovement in durable goods
consumption vis-a`-vis nondurables following a monetary policy shocks.6 In this paper, we show
that the same property also produces a counterfactually negative comovement in house prices for a
government spending shock. In a lender-borrower DSGE model, the shadow value of housing for the
lender, defined as the product of the relative price of housing and marginal utility of consumption, is
determined by the expected infinite sum of discounted marginal utility of housing. Two key features
make the shadow value of housing approximately constant. First, the marginal utility of housing
depends on the stock of housing. Housing flows do not contribute much to the variation in this stock
4We are aware of only one previous study by Afonso and Sousa (2008) who examined the effects of govern-
ment spending shocks on US house prices. Although they do not control for expectations in the identification
of shocks, our findings are still consistent with theirs. As it turns out, controlling for expectations has a big
effect on the timing of the peak response of consumption to government spending shock. They also do not
explore the implications for DSGE models of housing which is one of the objectives of our paper.
5A recent example is Andres et al. (2012) who augment the fixed housing setup of Iacoviello (2005) with
search and matching frictions to study the size of fiscal multipliers in response to government spending
shocks.
6More recently, Sterk (2010) highlights the role of the quasi-constancy property to re-examine the extent
to which credit frictions can resolve the lack of comovement between durable and non-durable consumption
in New Keynesian models following a monetary tightening, as studied by Monacelli (2009).
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and thus it remains close to its steady state. Second, temporary government spending shocks exert
little influence on the future marginal utility of housing. Increased government spending financed
by either increasing taxes or by household bond-holdings, lowers the present value of disposable
income. The reduced current income causes an increase in the shadow value of lenders’ income, and
a fall in current consumption. Since the shadow value of housing remains approximately constant,
it follows that the relative price of housing must fall. Thus, the quasi-constancy property combined
with the increased shadow value of lenders’ income after a temporary government shock explains
the response of house prices in the model.
We argue that this counterfactual decline in house prices is a general result for existing DSGE
models by showing that a number of extensions to the baseline model that modify production
structure and preferences, do not alter this property. Specifically, we consider modifications to
the baseline model such as restricting housing supply, introducing nominal stickiness in housing
production, non-separable preferences, Edgeworth complementarity between private and public
consumption, and deep habits in consumption and government spending. We find that these
mechanisms are unable to break the quasi-constancy property, or prevent a rise in the shadow
value of income following a government spending shock. Rather, we find that these mechanisms
provide a positive consumption response by changing the relationship between consumption and
the shadow value of income. Since the latter still rises, the counterfactual decline in house prices
remains a feature of a broad class of DSGE models of housing.
Finally, we consider a more direct way to have an increase in the shadow value of income through
monetary policy accommodation of government spending shocks. The particular specification is
similar to that in Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) and allows the possibility of a fall in the real
interest rate which provides an incentive to increase current consumption, and hence, offset the
negative wealth effect. We present evidence that real interest rates fall after a positive government
spending shock to motivate accommodative monetary policy as a channel that contributes to this
decline in the real interest rate. For strong accommodation, house prices and total consumption
increase after a positive government spending shock. But the model does not deliver the persistent
rise in house prices and consumption as evident from the SVAR findings, and, therefore, accounting
for the observed evidence on real house prices remains a significant challenge for DSGE models of
3
housing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical evidence. Section
3 presents a baseline DSGE model of housing. Section 4 provides an explanation of why house
prices fall in the model. Section 5 summarizes the findings of a variety of modifications of the
baseline model. Section 6 considers accommodative monetary policy. Section 7 concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we use a structural VAR setup to establish the empirical regularity that real house
prices rise in aggregate U.S. data following a positive shock to government spending.
Our point of departure is a quarterly VAR with six variables as follows:
Xt = α0 + α1t+ α2t
2 +A(L)Xt−1 + et (1)
Xt =
[
Gt Tt Yt Ct Qt Rt
]′
Where, Gt is real total government expenditure and investment, Tt is total tax receipts less transfer
payments, Yt is real total output, Ct is real total private consumption less consumption on housing
and utilities, Qt is the real median price of new houses, and Rt is the real Fed Funds rate. We
consider the first four variables above in real log per-capita terms, and include a linear and quadratic
trend in the VAR specification in (1), to be consistent with the literature (eg. Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) and Ramey (2011)). Variables Tt and Qt are transformed into real terms by deflating nominal
values by the GDP deflator. The real Fed Funds rate is calculated by deducting annualized one
quarter ahead realized inflation, calculated using the GDP deflator, from the nominal Fed Funds
rate. The Appendix contains a detailed description of the series that we used.
Our baseline identification follows the seminal contribution of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and
identifies fiscal shocks by assuming that discretionary fiscal responses do not occur within the same
quarter as any innovation in output. By the time policy-makers realize that a shock has affected
the economy, and go through the planning and legal processes of implementing an appropriate
endogenous policy response, a quarter would have passed. In this setting, any innovation to fiscal
variables that are not predicted within the VAR system are interpreted as unexpected shocks to
spending or revenues. Since we are interested in estimating the effects of government spending
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shocks only (and not the effects of taxes on output), the timing assumption essentially reduces
to a Cholesky-ordering of the VAR with government spending ordered first.7 Specifically, this
implies that other shocks in the system do not affect government spending within a quarter, while
government spending affects the remaining variables in the same quarter. This approach has been
widely used (see Gal´ı et al. (2007), Fatas and Mihov (2001)) in demonstrating that increases in
government spending raise output, consumption and wages.
Ramey (2011), however, argues that if fiscal shocks are anticipated by private agents, the above
identification scheme will be misleading. Alongside decision lags, there may be implementation
lags in realizing fiscal policy. Often, governments announce their intended spending in advance,
and the actual spending occurs in a staggered manner over a longer period of time. Private agents,
then, would anticipate government spending well in advance and adjust their optimal consumption
behaviour accordingly, while the econometrician would only see the effect of the policy when actual
spending increases. If, contrary to the finding of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), private consumption
were to decline upon the announcement of future increases in spending, a mis-timed VAR analysis
would only capture the return of consumption to steady state, and not the initial decline. Thus,
the econometrician will mistakenly infer that consumption rises following a spending increase.
To account for any such anticipation effects, we follow Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) and
augment our benchmark VAR specification with information on expectations of future spending
to control for the forecastable component of actual government spending. Specifically we consider
Xˆt =
[
FEGt Gt Tt Yt Ct Qt Rt
]′
, where FEGt is the forecast error from private sector
forecasts of the growth rate of government spending.8 The unanticipated shock, then, is identified
as the innovation in the forecast error itself, rather than an innovation to Gt.
The data for the baseline specification span from the third quarter of 1966 through the third
quarter of 2010, where both the start and end dates are restricted by availability of the forecast
error variable.
7For the effects of taxation on output, see Romer and Romer (2010) and Mertens and Ravn (2012), who
provide evidence on the aggregate effects of tax shocks in the US and Cloyne (2013) for the UK.
8We use the series constructed by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) by splicing two separate one-
quarter-ahead forecasts of governments expenditure as follows: (i) from the Survey of Professional Forecasters
(SPF), available from 1982 onwards and (ii) forecasts prepared by the Federal Reserve Board staff for the
meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (Greenbook), available from 1966 through 2004.
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Figure 1 shows the impulse responses of a one standard deviation shock to government spending.
The first column collects impulse responses to government shocks identified via Cholesky ordering
as in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), while the second column corresponds to the Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012) identification through shocks to private sector forecast errors on govern-
ment spending. The responses of all the variables are expressed in standard-deviations from their
respective means.
Clearly, following a positive unanticipated government spending shock, both consumption and
house prices rise in a persistent manner regardless of the presence of anticipation effects. In par-
ticular, the response for house prices are both economically and statistically significant.
This finding of increasing real house prices following a positive shock to government spending
is robust to a slew of reasonable variations of our baseline specification. In particular, this result is
robust to (a) the exclusion of linear and quadratic time trends in (1), (b) doubling the lag length,
(c) correcting for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the error terms of the VAR system, (d)
considering various subsamples of the data, (e) the exclusion of output, consumption or interest
rate variables from the VAR system, (f) alternative ordering of the variables other than government
spending, (g) deflating the nominal house prices with the PCE deflator or the CPI index, and (h)
alternate measures of house prices.9 Importantly, the result of an increasing real house price is also
robust to identifying government spending shocks using the Ramey and Shapiro (1998) military
dummies.10 Figures 2 and 3 show the results from these robustness exercises.
To summarize, empirical evidence suggests that real house prices rise in a persistent manner
after a positive government spending shock. We now turn to a DSGE model of housing to examine
channels through which government spending shocks may affect house prices, and account for the
observed evidence.
9In particular, we consider the Shiller (2015) historic home price index.
10Note, however, that the sample considered in the appendix figure runs from 1963Q1 through 2014Q1.
This allows 3 military dummies: in 1965Q1, 1980Q1 and 2001Q3.
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3 A DSGE Model with Housing
We consider a DSGE model with housing production based on Iacoviello and Neri (2010), and
determine the effects on government spending shocks on real house prices as our baseline case.
The simpler case of fixed housing supply, as in Iacoviello (2005), is embedded within this setup
and considered in the robustness exercises. The baseline setup features two types of representative
households: patient lenders and impatient borrowers, and two production sectors: the non-housing
sector produces (non-durable) consumption and investment goods, while the housing sector pro-
duces new homes.
3.1 Households
The two types of agents in the economy are characterized by different rates of time preference. A
fraction, 0 < α < 1, of the population are impatient agents who discount the future at a rate higher
than patient agents. The size of the total population is normalized to one. Both agents receive
utility from consuming a non-durable good, and from the service flows of the stock of housing they
own. Both supply labour to the housing and nonhousing production sectors. Patient agents are
net lenders. They hold government debt, and own physical capital which they rent out to the
production sector. Impatient agents are net borrowers. Due to the presence of financial frictions,
the borrowers face a constraint on the amount they can borrow in each period by using their stock
of housing as collateral. As in Iacoviello (2005), the amount of uncertainty in the economy is
small enough such that for borrowers, the effect of impatience on borrowing always dominates the
precautionary motive for self-saving and consequently the collateral constraint is always binding in
equilibrium.
The optimization problems of patient-lenders and impatient-borrowers are to maximize the
expected discounted lifetime utility given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtj
{
ln cjt + Υ
j lnhjt −
1
1 + η
[(
njt
)1+ξ
+
(
nhjt
)1+ξ] 1+η1+ξ}
where j = ` for the patient-lenders and j = b for the impatient-borrowers. The variables ct, ht, nt,
and nht denote non-durable consumption, housing services, and labour supplied to the nonhousing
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and housing production sectors, respectively.11 The parameters βj , Υ
j , and η denote the discount
factor, the weight of housing in the utility function, and the inverse Frisch elasticity of labour
supply, respectively.
Patient-lenders maximize their utility subject to the following budget constraint:
c`t + qth
`
t + it + i
h
t + b
g
t + bt = wtn
`
t + w
h
t n
h`
t +
(
1− δh
)
qth
`
t−1 + rtkt−1 + r
h
t k
h
t−1 + d
`
t
+
rnt−1b
g
t−1
pit
+
rnt−1bt−1
pit
− τ `t (2)
where qt is the relative price of housing stock, kt and k
h
t represent capital rented out to the nonhous-
ing and housing production sectors, rt and r
h
t are the real rental returns on the two types of capital,
and it and i
h
t represent gross investment on the two types of capital. Alongside investing in capital,
patient households own firms in the production sector from which they receive dividends, d`t, lend
an amount bt (in real terms) to borrowers, and hold government debt b
g
t (in real terms), both for
the same rate of real gross return rnt /pit+1, where r
n
t is the nominal interest rate and pit+1 is the
gross inflation rate. Finally, τ `t is a lump-sum tax imposed by the government on patient-lenders.
The capital accumulation processes for the two sectors are given as
kt = (1− δkc)kt−1 + φ
(
it
kt−1
)
kt−1 (3)
kht = (1− δkh)kht−1 + φh
(
iht
kht−1
)
kht−1 (4)
Where δkc is the depreciation rate of capital in the nonhousing sector, φ(.) denotes capital adjust-
ment costs which are increasing, concave, and homogenous of degree zero in the rate of investment,
with φ′(i/k) = 1, and φ(i/k) = i/k, implying zero costs in the steady state. δkh and φh(.) corre-
spond to similar expressions for the housing sector.
Impatient borrowers face the following budget constraint:
cbt + qth
b
t +
rnt−1bt−1
pit
= wtn
b
t + w
h
t n
hb
t + qt
(
1− δh
)
hbt−1 + bt − τ bt (5)
11We assume that housing services are proportional to housing stock and normalize the constant of pro-
portionality to one. This means that housing services are a depreciation weighted sum of the housing service
flows. Since housing is durable by definition, its depreciation is typically small implying a low flow-stock
ratio.
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where τ bt is a lump-sum tax. The impatient-borrowers also face a collateral constraint
bt ≤ mEt
{
qt+1h
b
tpit+1
rnt
}
(6)
which says that the real debt services due next period cannot exceed a fraction m ∈ [0, 1] of the
expected real value of the housing stock held as collateral. Since only a fraction 0 < m < 1 of the
expected discounted value of housing stock is available for borrowing, (1−m) can be interpreted
as a down-payment requirement, and m the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio.
Denoting the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints (2), (3), and (4) as λ`1t, λ
`
2t and λ
`
3t, the
first-order necessary conditions for the patient-lenders which characterize the optimal choices of
their consumption, labour supply, housing, investment, capital, lending and government bonds are,
respectively, as follows:
1
c`b
= λ`t
λ`1twt =
[(
n`t
)1+ξ
+
(
nh`t
)1+ξ] 1+η1+ξ−1 (
n`t
)ξ
λ`1tw
h
t =
[(
n`t
)1+ξ
+
(
nh`t
)1+ξ] 1+η1+ξ−1 (
nh`t
)ξ
Υ
h`t
= λ`1tqt − β`(1− δh)Et[λ`1t+1qt+1]
1 = ψtφ
′
(
it
kt−1
)
= ψht φ
′
h
(
iht
kht−1
)
ψt = β`Et
[
λ`1t+1
λ`1t
{
rt+1 + ψt+1
(
(1− δ) + φ
(
it+1
kt
)
− φ′
(
it+1
kt
)
it+1
kt
)}]
ψht = β`Et
[
λ`1t+1
λ`1t
{
rht+1 + ψ
h
t+1
(
(1− δh) + φh
(
iht+1
kht
)
− φ′h
(
iht+1
kht
)
iht+1
kht
)}]
1 = β`Et
[
λ`1t+1
λ`1t
rnt
pit+1
]
where ψt and ψ
h
t , defined as λ
`
2t/λ
`
1t and λ
`
3t/λ
`
1t, represent the marginal value of capital in the
nonhousing and housing sectors in terms of the consumption, with (2), (3), and (4) satisfied at the
optimum.
Denoting the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints (5) and (6) as λb1t and λ
b
2t, the first-order-
conditions for the impatient-borrowers that characterize the optimal choices of their consumption,
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labour supply, housing, and borrowing are, respectively, as follows:
1
cbt
= λb1t
λb1twt =
[(
nbt
)1+ξ
+
(
nhbt
)1+ξ] 1+η1+ξ−1 (
nbt
)ξ
λb1tw
h
t =
[(
nbt
)1+ξ
+
(
nhbt
)1+ξ] 1+η1+ξ−1 (
nhbt
)ξ
Υ
hbt
= λb1tqt − βb(1− δh)Et
[
λb1t+1qt+1
]
− λb2tEt
[
mqt+1pit+1
Rt
]
λb1t = βbEt
[
λb1t+1
Rt
pit+1
]
+ λb2t
with (5) and (6) satisfied at the optimum.
3.2 Nonhousing Production Sector and Nominal Rigidities
To introduce price rigidities in the nonhousing sector, we assume a two-step production and pricing
process in the New Keynesian tradition. There is a perfectly competitive final goods firm that
produces non-durable consumption good, yt, from a continuum of intermediate goods, xt(s), with
s ∈ [0, 1], purchased at price pt(s) from monopolistically competitive intermediate firms, using the
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator function:
yt =
(∫ 1
0
xt(s)
−1
 dx
) 
−1
Both final and intermediate good producing firms are owned by the patient households. The final
goods firm’s profit maximization problem leads to the following input demand function:
xt(s) =
(
pt(s)
pt
)−
yt
Intermedite goods firms choose capital and labour to minimize the cost of production while facing
the following production technology:
yt(s) = kt−1(s)γnt(s)1−γ
where total labour demand,
nt(s) = αn
`
t(s) + (1− α)n(s)bt
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Intermediate goods firms also set nominal prices in a monopolistically competitive environment,
subject to the standard Calvo (1983) friction, taking as given the input demand function above.
Each firm faces a probability (1− θ) of choosing an optimal price at each period. This setup
generates the familiar log-linearized New Keynesian Phillips Curve:
pˆit = β`pˆit+1 − (1− θ) (1− β`θ)
θ
mˆct
where variables with hats denote logged deviation from their respective steady-states, and mct
denotes the marginal cost of the representative intermediate firm.
3.3 Housing Production Sector
There are no nominal rigidities in the housing market.12 A representative firm produces new homes
Y ht using total capital and labour available to the housing sector and a Cobb-Douglas technology:
Y ht =
(
Kht−1
)µ (
Nht
)(1−µ)
It then sells newly produced homes at price qt. The firm’s optimal choices determine the demand
for capital, Kht , and labour, N
h
t , specific to the housing sector. Total housing stock available to the
two types of households to purchase and hold each period equals the existing undepreciated stock
of housing plus new homes produced by the housing sector.
Ht = (1− δh)Ht−1 + Y ht
3.4 Fiscal and monetary policies
We follow Gal´ı et al. (2007) for the fiscal policy specifications. The government faces the following
budget constraint in real terms:
τt + b
g
t =
rnt−1b
g
t−1
pit
+Gt
12Following Iacoviello and Neri (2010), our benchmark formulation rules out price rigidities for a number
of reasons. First, housing is relatively expensive on a per-unit basis. As such, housing transactions usually
involve significant degree of negotiations among buyers and sellers that would make the price relatively
flexible. Second, most homes are priced for the first time when they are sold, and as such do not conform to
a Calvo-type rigidity.
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where τt is lump-sum tax revenue (which equals (1− α)τ `t + ατ bt ) and Gt is government spending.
The government sets taxes according to the following fiscal rule
τ˜t = %bb˜
g
t + %g g˜t
where g˜t ≡ Gt−GY , τ˜t ≡ τt−τY and b˜gt ≡ Bt−BY are deviations of the fiscal variables from a steady
state with zero debt and balanced primary budget (normalized by steady-state level of output).
Parameters %b and %g are weights assigned by the fiscal authority on debt and current government
spending. Note that government debt is not modelled as discountable bonds, and pays nominal gross
interest rnt each period. This form of government debt makes it easier to compare intertemporal
decisions of households across different saving instruments. Government purchases are assumed to
follow an exogenously determined auto-regressive process:
g˜t = ρg g˜t−1 + εt
where 0 < ρg < 1 and εt is an i.i.d. government spending shock with variance σ
2
ε .
We assume that monetary policy is characterized by a Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing
which determines the nominal interest rate in the economy as a function of inflation, output, and
the previous period’s nominal interest rate. This rule is given as
rˆnt = %rrˆ
n
t−1 + (1− %r)(%pipˆit + %yyˆt)
where %pi > 1 (i.e., the Taylor principle holds), %y > 0, and 0 < %r < 1 are the policy rule
parameters.
3.5 Aggregation
Aggregate consumption, labor in both sectors, and housing (all denoted in upper case) are weighted
averages of the variables corresponding to patient-lenders and impatient-borrowers and are given
as:
Ct = αc
b
t + (1− α) c`t
Nt = αn
b
t + (1− α)n`t
Nht = αn
hb
t + (1− α)nh`t
Ht = αh
b
t + (1− α)h`t
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Since capital is owned only by patient-lenders, aggregate investment and capital are given as
It = (1− α)it
Kt = (1− α)kt
Iht = (1− α)iht
Kht = (1− α)kht
Finally, the aggregate resource constraint in the non-housing and housing sectors are given as:
Yt ≈
(
Kt−1
)γ(
Nt
)1−γ
= Ct + φ
(
It
Kt−1
)
Kt−1 + φh
(
Iht
Kht−1
)
Kht−1 +Gt
Y ht ≈
(
Kht−1
)µ (
Nht
)1−µ
= Ht − (1− δh)Ht−1
where the aggregate production function holds up to a first-order approximation as shown in Wood-
ford (2003), and It and I
h
t are the two components of business investment. The economy is in
equilibrium when all the first-order necessary conditions are satisfied and all the goods and factor
markets clear.
3.6 Linearization, calibration, and model solution
We log-linearize the first-order optimality conditions of the households and firms, and the aggregate
market clearing conditions around a steady state. We use hats on variables to denote the percent-
age deviations from their steady-state values, respectively. We linearize the government budget
constraint (7) around a steady state with zero debt and primary balanced budget.13
The model is set in a quarterly frequency. The calibration of the model is based closely on the
empirical findings in Iacoviello and Neri (2010). The discount factors of the patient-lenders and
the impatient-borrowers are set to 0.99 and 0.97, respectively. This ensures that the borrowing
constraint is binding in equilibrium. The inverse elasticity parameters in the labour market, η and
ξ are set to 0.5 and 0.8, which fall within the bounds of estimated results of Iacoviello and Neri
(2010).
13Note that hatted variables are expressed in percentage deviations, i.e., deviations from their steady state
values, normalized by their respective steady state levels. Government variables marked with a tilde, on the
other hand, are deviations from their steady state values, normalized by the steady-state level of output. In
other words, Xˆt = lnXt− lnX ≈ Xt−XX and X˜t = Xt−XGDP where GDP is steady-state level of total output in
the two sectors.
13
For the non-housing sector, the capital share of output, γ, is set to 0.35, and the depreciation
rate of capital, δkc, is set to 0.025. We assume a steady-state price markup of 0.15, implying a
steady-state marginal cost, mc, of 11.15 ≈ 0.87. We set the Calvo price-adjustment frequency to
0.83, implying that prices are re-optimized on average once every 6 quarters. The elasticity of
capital adjustment cost parameter, φ′′( ik ), is set to −14.25, to match the corresponding parameter
estimated by Iacoviello and Neri (2010) using Bayesian methods.
For the housing sector, the capital share of output, µ, is set to 0.2, and the depreciation rate of
capital, δkh, is set to 0.03. The benchmark value of qH4×GDP = 1.36 is taken from Iacoviello and Neri
(2010), and corresponds to the total value of household real estate assets in the US, as specified
in the Flow of Funds Account (B.100 line 4). The benchmark loan-to-value ratio is set at 0.85.
We set the housing-sector productive capital to GDP ratio following Iacoviello and Neri (2010) as
Kh
4×GDP = 0.04.
We set the Taylor rule parameter measuring the response of the monetary authority to inflation,
%pi, to 1.5, and the parameter for the response to ouput, %y, to 0.5—values commonly used in the
literature. We match the benchmark values of the fiscal response parameters to those in Gal´ı et al.
(2007), and set the tax response to government spending, %g, to 0.1, the tax response to outstanding
government debt, %b, to 0.33, and the persistence of government shock, ρg, to 0.9.
The dynamics presented in this paper depend importantly on the different optimal responses of
patient-lenders and impatient-borrowers to a government spending shock. The exposition of these
differences in dynamics become easier if we start off the two households with identical consumption
and housing levels. As such, we set c
`
GDP =
cb
GDP =
C
GDP = 65% and
qh`
GDP =
qhb
GDP =
qH
GDP . The
first can be easily achieved by assuming different levels of steady-state lump-sum taxes.14 The
latter can be achieved by setting different values for the weight of housing in utility. We set the
steady-state non-residential investment share of GDP to 13%, and residential investment share of
GDP to 7% following U.S. data. This, along with a steady-state consumption share of GDP of
65%, implies a steady-state government share of GDP of 15%.
The main result that we highlight in this paper arises as long as the proportion of savers
14See the discussion in Gal´ı et al. (2007).
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(Ricardian agents), 1 − α, in the economy is positive.15 The rule-of-thumb literature often sets
the proportion of non-Ricardian agents to 0.5. We therefore set the benchmark value of α to 0.5
for ease of exposition. An online appendix summarizes the benchmark model and the calibration
values. We use Dynare to solve the model.16
4 The effects of government spending shocks on house
prices
Figure 4 presents the effects of a one standard deviation positive shock to government spending for
the benchmark calibration reported in Table 1. The relative price of housing falls immediately after
a positive government spending shock. This response is in sharp contrast to the evidence presented
in section 2 and the key finding that we wish to study from the perspective of a DSGE model.
Why does the relative price of housing fall after a positive government spending shock? The
intuition follows from a general property of the DSGE model of housing—the approximately con-
stant shadow value of housing for lenders. The property of near-constant shadow value of long-lived
goods was first pointed out in Barsky et al. (2007) as the source of a counterfactually negative co-
movement in durable goods consumption vis-a`-vis nondurables following a monetary policy shock.
In this paper, we demonstrate that the same property generates a counterfactual decline in house
prices following a government spending shock.
Housing is a long-lived good and provides a service-flow for many periods in the future. We can
define the shadow value of housing for the patient-lender as v`t ≡ λ`1tqt and, using the first-order-
condition for optimal housing, express it in log-linearized form as
vˆ`t ≡ λˆ`1t + qˆt = (β` − 1)Et
[ ∞∑
s=0
βs` hˆ
`
t+s
]
(7)
≈ 0 (8)
There are two key features which make the deviations of shadow value of housing from its steady
state, vˆ`t , approximately zero, as indicated in (8). First, the housing flows do not contribute much
15Iacoviello and Neri (2010) estimate the proportion of borrowers α to be 0.21, and consequently, the
proportion of savers to be 0.79.
16See Adjemian et al. (2011) and http://www.dynare.org/.
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to the variation in the stock, which means that the marginal utility of housing remains close to its
steady state (i.e., the hˆ`t+s terms are close to zero). Second, temporary government spending shocks
have little influence on the future marginal utility of housing (i.e., the hˆ`t+s = 0 as s increases).
Now, the intuition for why house prices decrease is as follows. Government spending is financed
by taxes and bonds. Thus, increased government spending means lowered present value of dispos-
able income. The shadow value of lenders’ income rises after a temporary (positive) government
spending shock, i.e., λˆ`1t > 0. This means that real house prices must decrease, qˆt < 0, as the
shadow value of housing is approximately constant.
As shown if Figure 4, current consumption falls, cˆ`t < 0. There are three forces that are behind
this fall in lenders’ consumption. First, a temporary fall in after-tax income causes a small negative
income effect, and pushes consumption down. Second, as government spending increases output
and inflation, the central bank’s monetary policy implies an increase in the real interest rate which
raises λ`1t relative to λ
`
1t+1 from the Euler equation, resulting in a fall in current consumption.
Third, the decline in the relative price of housing lowers income for the lenders from lending to
borrowers, reinforcing the negative income effect.
It is important to note that this result does not depend on the structure of the labour market.
Following Gal´ı et al. (2007), we consider a departure from competitive labour markets and set wages
by unionized bargaining where marginal disabilities of labour supplies are equated among the two
types of agents. The results remain the same.17 Moreover, Andres et al. (2012) introduce job search
and unionized bargaining to provide a significant departure from the competitive labour market we
consider here. Yet, even under that labour market structure they report that house prices fall.18
Thus, relative to the SVAR evidence reported in section 2, the counterfactual response of house
prices to a government spending shock arises not only in the benchmark model but also in variants
with a richer labour market structure.
In contrast to the patient-lenders, the shadow value of housing for the impatient-borrowers rises
after the government spending shock. This rise reflects the desire to increase housing to use it as
17Available upon request.
18See Figures 2, 3, and 4 in Andres et al. (2012). Since Andres et al. (2012) focus on studying fiscal
multipliers, they do not examine whether the house price response to a positive government spending shock
is consistent with empirical evidence as we do.
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collateral for future consumption. From (7), we define the shadow value of housing to the impatient-
borrower as vbt ≡ λb1tqt and express it in log-linearized form (after simplifying the coefficients using
steady state conditions) as
vˆbt ≡ λˆb1t + qˆt = (βb − 1)Et
∞∑
s=0
βsb hˆ
b
t+s
+ m(β` − βb)Et
∞∑
s=0
βsb
(
λˆb2t+s + pˆit+1+s − rˆnt+s + qˆt+1+s + hˆbt+s
)
(9)
The increase in the shadow value of housing, vˆbt > 0, is driven by the sharp tightening of the current
and expected future collateral constraints λˆb2t+s(> 0).
Turning to the response of consumption, the patient-lenders’ consumption always falls after a
positive government spending shock as mentioned earlier. Consumption of the impatient-borrowers
falls even further because in addition to the decrease in the present value of disposable income, the
value of their collateral declines when house prices fall. This lowers their ability to borrow, which
in turn, lowers consumption. Total consumption and investment are crowded out while output rises
after the positive government spending shock.19
5 Modifications
From section 4, it is evident that house prices fall after a positive government spending shock be-
cause the shadow value of lenders’ income rises. In this section we draw on the literature and con-
sider five relevant modifications of the benchmark model to explore whether any of them can deliver
a positive response of house prices to government spending shocks.20 These are: (a) fixed housing
(Iacoviello (2005)), (b) sticky house prices (Barsky et al. (2007)), (c) non-separable (GHH) pref-
erences (Greenwood et al. (1988), Monacelli and Perotti (2009), Bilbiie (2009), Kilponen (2012)),
(d) Edgeworth complementarity between government and private spending (Bouakez and Rebei
(2007), Feve et al. (2013)), and (e) deep-habits (Ravn et al. (2006), Zubairy (2010), Jacob (2010)).
19These responses are consistent with those reported in Callegari (2007) who focuses on how in the presence
of durable goods the response of consumption to government spending shock changes relative to when rule-
of-thumb consumers are considered as in Gal´ı et al. (2007).
20We provide the details of model derivations in an online appendix available at http://http-
server.carleton.ca/ hashkhan/.
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Figure 5 summarizes the results for these five cases. We find that none of these modifications
break the quasi-constancy property highlighted in section 4. The shadow value of income always
rises for lenders, and consequently, house prices always fall after a government spending shock.
Any positive response in consumption, then, is generated by changing the relationship between
consumption and the shadow value of income.21
6 Monetary policy accommodation
The findings in the previous sections reveal that neither modifications to preferences along the lines
considered in existing literature, nor including sticky house prices can reconcile the house price
response in the DSGE model. We now consider monetary policy accommodation of government
spending shocks. That is, we allow monetary policy to respond directly to government spending
shocks. This specification is similar to the one considered in Nakamura and Steinsson (2013).
Specifically, we consider an augmented policy rule of the form
rˆnt = ρrrˆ
n
t−1 + (1− ρr)(%pipˆit + %yyˆt + %g gˆt), 0 < ρr < 1, %pi > 1, %y > 0, %g < 0 (10)
A motivation for the assumption %g < 0 in (10), is given in the empirical response of real interest
rates to government spending shocks in Figure 1. Real interest rates fall regardless of whether
anticipated effects have been accounted for. This, therefore, provides direct evidence to motivate
the accommodative monetary policy specification (10) and it can be viewed as a channel that
contributes to the observed decline in the real interest rate.22
Figure 6 shows the results when %g = −1. We choose this value to illustrate that under strong
monetary policy accommodation, house prices and total consumption can rise after a positive
government spending shock.
21The appendix provides analytical details for these results.
22A further indirect motivation for augmented monetary policy rule comes from recent evidence presented
in Melina and Villa (2013). They show that the spread between the 3-month bank prime loan rate and the
T-bill rate falls significantly after a positive government spending shock. This reduction in bank spread can
promote borrowing and can have an indirect expansionary effect on the economy. In a DSGE model with
the banking sector, Gerali et al. (2010) show that the interest spread on retail loans depends positively on
the policy rate. Although they do not consider government spending shocks, their model offers a theoretical
mechanism that can rationalize the evidence in Melina and Villa (2013).
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The findings reported in this section clarify that besides a strong monetary accommodation of
government spending shocks, it is in general difficult to obtain a positive house price response in
a DSGE model of housing. A further challenge for this class of models is that they do not deliver
hump-shaped responses to house prices and consumption in comparison to the identified responses
in Figures 1-3. Our findings suggest that accounting for house price movements and developing a
stronger propagation mechanism for government spending shocks in a DSGE model of housing is a
fruitful area for future work.
7 Conclusion
We showed that a broad class of DSGE models with housing and collateralized borrowing predict
house prices to fall after positive government spending shocks. The quasi-constant shadow value
of lenders’ housing and a rise in the shadow value of lenders’ income after a positive government
spending shock are the key reasons for this result. By contrast, we present evidence that real house
prices in the US rise following positive government spending shocks, estimated using a structural
vector autoregression methodology that accounts for anticipated effects. We clarify that modi-
fying the production structure or preferences alone does not help in obtaining the correct house
price response. We also show that only when monetary policy strongly accommodates government
spending shocks, we obtain positive impact effects on house prices. Even with monetary accom-
modation, however, the model does not deliver the persistent rise in house prices as evident from
the SVAR findings. Properly accounting for the effects of government spending shocks on house
prices, therefore, remains a significant challenge for DSGE models of housing.
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Data description
All data used in the benchmark specification are publicly available for download from the FRED
database. The FRED mnemonics are given below
• Gt = Government consumption expenditures and gross investment (GCEC96, seasonally ad-
justed, Chained 2009$)
• Tt = Government Current Tax Receipts (W054RC1Q027SBEA) + Government Income Receipts
on Assets (W058RC1Q027SBEA) + Government Current Transfer Receipts (W060RC1Q027SBEA)
- Government Current Transfer Payments (A084RC1Q027SBEA) - Government Interest Pay-
ments (A180RC1Q027SBEA) - Government Subsidies (GDISUBS). T is nominal, converted to
real after dividing by the GDP deflator (GDPDEF, seasonally adjusted, 2009=100).
• Yt = Real Gross Domestic Product (GDPC1, seasonally adjuste, Chained 2009$)
• Ct = Real private consumption expenditure (PCECC96, seasonally adjusted, Chained 2009$) -
Real personal consumption expenditure on housing and utilities (DHUTRX1Q020SBEA, season-
ally adjusted, Chained 2009$)
• Qt = Median Sales Price for New Houses Sold in the United States (MSPNHSUS). This series
is then seasonally adjusted and deflated by the GDP deflator above.
• Rt = Effective Fed Funds Rate (FEDFUNDS) - one quarter ahead annualized quarter-over-
quarter inflation in the GDP deflator.
The first four series are converted to per capital using the census bureau civilian population
(all ages) estimates.23
23Available at https://www.census.gov/popest/data/national/totals/2015/files/NA-EST2015-01.xlsx.
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Table 1: Parameter values and steady-state ratios
Parameter Description Value
β` Patient-lenders’ discount factor 0.9925
η Inverse elasticity of labour supply 0.5
ξ Inverse elasticity of labour substitution across sectors 0.8
δ Depreciation rate of non-housing sector capital 0.025
δh Depreciation rate of housing sector capital 0.01
φ′′ (δ) Capital adjustment cost for non-housing sector -14.25
φ′′h
(
δh
)
Capital adjustment cost of housing sector -10.75
βb Impatient-borrowers’ discount factor 0.97
m Loan-to-value ratio 0.85
α Share of patient lenders in the economy 0.5
γ Capital share of non-housing output 0.35
µ Capital share of housing output 0.2
 Dixit-Stiglitz aggregation parameter 7.67
θ Calvo price-adjustment frequency 0.83
%r Interest rate persistence in Taylor rule 0.8
%pi Taylor rule response to inflation 1.5
%y Taylor rule response to output gap 0.5
%g Tax response to government spending 0.1
%b Tax response to government debt 0.33
ρg Persistence parameter for government shock 0.8
C
GDP
Consumption share of GDP 0.65
I
GDP
Business invesment share of GDP 0.13
q × Y H
GDP
Housing investment to GDP 0.07
G
GDP
Government share of GDP 0.15
q ×H
4×GDP Housing wealth 1.36
KH
4×GDP Housing sector capital 0.04
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Figure 1: Impulse responses of key variables to a government spending shock
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Notes : Broken blue lines correspond to the 16th and 84th percentile confidence bands calcu-
lated from from 1000 Monte Carlo simulations. The first column represents shocks identified
using Cholesky ordering with Government Spending ordered first, as in Blanchard and Per-
otti (2002). Second column represents shocks identified via private-sector forecast errors of
government spending, as in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012).
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Figure 2: Impulse responses of key variables to a government spending shock –
robustness
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Notes : Broken blue lines correspond to the 16th and 84th percentile confidence bands calcu-
lated from from 1000 Monte Carlo simulations. Column 1 excludes linear and quadratic time
trends from the baseline specification. Column 2 increases the lag length from 4 to 8. Column
3 considers the Newey-West estimator for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent
standard errors. Column 4 stops the sample at 1995.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses of key variables to a government spending shock –
robustness (contd.)
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Notes : Broken blue lines correspond to the 16th and 84th percentile confidence bands calcu-
lated from from 1000 Monte Carlo simulations. All VAR specifications in this figure exclude
the output and interest rate variables from the baseline specification. Column 1 orders the
variables as G>X>C>Q. Column 2 orders them as G>X>Q>C. Column 3 considers the
Shiller (2015) house price index, deflated by the GDP deflator. Column 4 identifies gov-
ernment shocks as shocks to Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Ramey (2011) military date
dummies.
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Figure 4: Effects of a positive government spending shock in the baseline DSGE
model
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Notes : For the responses of shadow value of housing and consumption, the dashed line is for
lenders and dotted line is for borrower, respectively.
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Figure 5: Effects of government spending shocks: modifications of the baseline
DSGE model
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Figure 6: Effects of a positive government spending shock in the baseline DSGE
model with monetary accommodation
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Notes : For the responses of shadow value of housing and consumption, the dashed line is for
lenders and dotted line is for borrower, respectively.
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